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TAGS: [MOPS](#) [PHUM](#) [PINS](#) [PTER](#) [CASC](#) [IZ](#) [XP](#)  
SUBJECT: U.S. FORCES DETAINEE UPDATE; UPCOMING TRANSFER OF  
TAJI TIF; DETAINEE TRANSFER ISSUES

REF: BAGHDAD 199

Classified By: A/PMCouns W.S. Reid III for reasons 1.4(b) & (d).

11. (S) Summary. At this time, there are 5,830 detainees in U.S. custody, evenly distributed between the two U.S. theater internment facilities (TIFs) - Taji and Cropper. United States Forces - Iraq (USF-I) operations are under way to set the detainee populations in both the Taji and Cropper TIFs in preparation for the March 15 transfer of the Taji TIF to the GOI. The TIF, valued at \$107 million, includes Iraqi correction officer (ICO) housing and dining facilities, water and sewage treatment plants, and a new entrance check point (ECP). By transferring the Taji TIF to the GOI, the U.S. will expand the GOI's detention capabilities by approximately 2,000 bed spaces, which will allow the GOI to transfer detainees from overcrowded GOI detention facilities to the new Taji TIF. In addition to the facilities, USF-I plans to transfer approximately 3,000 medium-threat detainees to the GOI. Currently, about 1,000 of the Taji TIF detainees are release eligible, meaning the U.S. cannot transfer them to the GOI without an arrest warrant, detention order, or conviction order. As the time for transfer is fast approaching, the USG will continue to stress to the GOI the importance of GOI-produced detainee transfer paperwork prior to the facility transfer and the consequences of its failure to do so. End Summary.

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USF-I DETAINEE UPDATE  
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12. (S) As of February 17, there were 5,830 detainees in U.S. custody. That number included three third-country nationals, 137 enduring security threats, 1,851 dangerous radicals, and 37 former regime element officials (to include Sultan Hashim, former Saddam-era Minister of Defense). Since January 1, 2009, USF-I has released 7,985 detainees, transferred to the GOI 1,655 detainees, captured 286 individuals, and recaptured 33 persons.

13. (S) Approximately 1,600 of the nearly 6,000 U.S.-held detainees are release eligible (i.e. detainees for whom the GOI has not provided to the U.S. an arrest warrant, detention order or conviction order). These release-eligible detainees include 342 dangerous radicals, 38 enduring security threats, and 374 medium-threat AQI detainees. If the GOI does not provide arrest warrants, detention orders, or conviction orders to the U.S. for these detainees by July 1, USF-I will be required under the Security Agreement to release many of these individuals. (Note and Comment: USF-I will transfer

the Cropper TIF to the GOI on July 15 (reftel). In order to accommodate new captures and some of those detainees who have been designated as enduring security threats and dangerous radicals, USF-I will maintain a 360-bed space facility in Compound Five, located near Camp Cropper. USF-I currently only plans to maintain a guard force of 100 personnel - only enough to safely guard 122 detainees, as originally planned. If a greater detainee population is envisioned, USF-I will need to deploy a larger guard force. End Note and Comment.)

¶4. (S) MG David Quantock, Deputy Commanding General - Detainee Operations (DCG-DO), previously addressed the lack of detainee transfer paperwork with the GOI (reftel) and Qof detainee transfer paperwork with the GOI (reftel) and again will address this issue with Joint Subcommittee on Detainee Affairs (JSC-DA) Co-Chair MG Husayn Kamal, Ministry of the Interior, National Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA), at the next JSC-DA on February 20. At that time, MG Quantock will stress the importance of the detainee transfer paperwork and the danger of releasing enduring security threat and dangerous radical detainees from the U.S. TIFs without first prosecuting them under the Iraqi justice system. (Note: Until the Iraqi national elections on March 7, USF-I will only release low-threat detainees. However, it is envisioned that USF-I will reassess this release policy after the elections should the GOI fail to provide detainee transfer paperwork on those release-eligible detainees in U.S. custody in preparation for the transfer of the Cropper TIF in July. End Note.)

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TAJI TIF INFRASTRUCTURE  
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¶5. (SBU) Upon transfer, the Taji TIF will be able to safely house approximately 5,000 detainees. (Note: Although the TIF will be transferred with 3,000 detainees, the GOI will gain an additional 2,000 bed spaces in which to transfer detainees from other Iraqi detention facilities. End Note.) In addition to the detainee housing facilities, the TIF includes a water treatment facility, with a 3-day storage capacity of 1.7 million liters; a sewage treatment plant; a \$500,000 kitchen facility to provide meals to the detainee population; a \$700,000 detainee property warehouse; and 17 generators. (Note: Although USF-I will provide generators to the GOI, a project is in place to connect the Taji TIF to the existing Iraqi power grid at a cost of \$4 million. End Note.)

¶6. (SBU) In order to house and feed the Iraqi correction officer (ICO) force rotations, USF-I built a \$4 million ICO village and a \$8.5 million ICO dining facility (DFAC), which can serve approximately 1,000 ICOs. The ICO village will consist of 24 barracks, administrative support facilities, and morale, welfare and recreation facilities that can be used by the ICO force during their work rotations.

¶7. (SBU) Previously, while reviewing the facility, the GOI complained that it had to cross a USF-I military installation for access to the TIF and were unable to access the TIF directly from the main road ("Route Tampa"). To remedy this, USF-I is in the process of connecting the new ECP to Route Tampa by a service road. The ECP will have a parking lot, separate female search trailer, badging trailer, playground, and waiting area.

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TAJI TIF POPULATION  
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¶8. (S) USF-I currently plans to transfer the Taji TIF to the GOI with medium-threat detainees only, to include Shia and low-threat AQI detainees. In order to accomplish this, USF-I is shifting high-threat detainees and their personal property from the Taji TIF to the Cropper TIF and at the same time is shifting low- and medium- threat detainees and their personal property from the Cropper TIF to the Taji TIF. The shift of the high-threat detainees is 100% complete, while the shift

of the low- and medium-threat detainees is 80% complete.

¶9. (S) Once these transfers are complete, Taji TIF will have a detainee population end state of 2,965, which will include 1,039 release-eligible detainees and 1,926 transfer-eligible detainees (i.e. detainees for whom the GOI has provided to the U.S. an arrest warrant, detention order or conviction order). (Note: At this time, there are approximately 1,600 detainees in U.S. custody who are release eligible. End Note.)

¶10. (S) Comment. It is clear that USF-I, with the transfer of this top-notch facility, is setting the GOI up for success. Whether the GOI is able to maintain this momentum and capitalize on the options this facility provides is another matter. The GOI has until this time been unable to provide transfer paperwork on the final 1,600 detainees, although the USG has stressed over time the importance of this issue. This failure by the GOI could halt USF-I plans to transfer its remaining detainee population, minus some enduring security threats and dangerous radicals, to the GOI in July. It is unclear whether the GOI will focus its efforts on this issue in the run-up to the March elections, which are quickly approaching. Following the distraction of the national elections, there must be a concerted effort to focus the caretaker government on the necessity of providing sorely needed transfer documents to facilitate the continued detention of these high-threat detainees. Should the caretaker government fail to provide this paperwork, it would represent a considerable security risk. Consequently, we would need to place this issue high on the agenda with the newly-formed government this summer. End Comment.  
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